这篇文章是一篇高阶哲学课的期末论文。因此不可避免地，本文基于一些一般读者未曾了解的专业论文。但本文所讨论的，又是一个在政治上颇有争议、火药味很重的话题。我非常担心本文的观点在不了解背景和限制条件的前提下被断章取义地看待。因此如果没有读过这些专业论文，我强烈建议您不要建议阅读本文。此外，由于本文包含许多机器翻译无法正确处理的术语（比如cis woman顺性别女性有时会被翻译为“双性人女性”），对于不能阅读英文的读者也不建议使用翻译器阅读本文。
顺带一提，虽然我在朋友圈将其描述为“今年截至目前我写的最好的论文，”但是因为今年我都在摆烂，也请不要对这篇文章的质量有过多期待。我一直有一个毛病，如果一天之内认真学习/写作的时间超过两个小时就会头疼。今年春天以为某人的按摩治好了我的毛病，结果这两天写这篇文章的时候又复发了。现在看来，这完全是因为从二月份到现在没有一天我认真学习/写作的时间超过两个小时。
阅读本文前必须阅读的论文有：
Section 1, 3.1, and 4.2 of Bettcher, T. M. (2017). Trans feminism: Recent philosophical developments. Philosophy Compass, 12(11). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12438
Frye, M. (1983). Oppression. In The politics of reality: Essays in feminist theory (pp. 1–16). Crossing Press.
Watson, L. (2016). The woman question. TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, 3(1-2), 246–253. https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-3334451
Abstract
At the beginning of this century, to help achieving liberation of women, Sally Haslanger defines woman as a person who is oppressed because they are believed to a have female body. Her definition is then criticized by Talia Bettcher and many other because it seems to exclude trans women, especially non-pass trans women, from women. In this essay, I will take Haslanger’s definition as a premise and examine if trans women are women, namely (1) if trans women are oppressed and (2) if they are oppressed because of female body. And I conclude that trans women are approximately women under Haslanger’s definition, and Haslanger may want to include trans women as women indeed.
Keywords: feminism, woman, transgender.
I. Introduction
Aiming to help end sexual oppression, Sally Haslanger defines woman as a person who “is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.[1]” (Haslanger, 2000) Combining with the claim “trans woman is not oppressed due to having a female reproductive body,” this definition of woman leads to the conclusion that trans women are not woman. To reject this conclusion, Jenkin (2016) and Bettcher (2013, 2014) argue that Haslanger’s definition of woman is doubtable, and Watson (2016) and Bettcher (2017) state that trans women are also oppressed as women. In this essay, I will assume that Haslanger’s account of women is correct, and evaluate the second argument, namely if trans women are oppressed due to their female reproductive role. I will mainly focuses on the invalidation of trans women’s identity, that is to say, believing they are “indeed man,” because this type of miserable situation is what Bettcher mainly focuses on. Besides, because Haslanger’s definition mainly rejects non-passing trans woman’s identity[2], non-passing trans women will be the target of analysis in this essay. I will argue that (1) Watson’s argument is inadequate, but (2) trans women are indeed oppressed, (3) though they are oppressed in a way different but connected to the oppression of woman, and, therefore, Haslanger should consider them as women.
II. Are trans women oppressed?
Watson claims that trans woman is oppressed because they are “denied employment,” “denied health care,” “forced into prostitution for survival,” “denied access to housing,” “violently attacked,” and even “murdered.” (Watson, 2016, pp.250) It seems evident that trans woman faces some barriers, and lives in miserable situation. However, it is not necessarily oppression.
As early as 1983, Marilyn Frye wrote that oppression is a “strong word” and is “much misused.” (Frye, 1983) She clarifies that not all barriers are oppression. A barrier might not be oppression if it does not contribute to a system that subordinates a group of people. She uses the example of the racial ghetto in the US to illustrate her point: relatively rich white people are prevented from going into a ghetto, as ghetto dwellers are equally prevented from going out. However, it cannot be said that this segregation oppresses both white people and ghetto dwellers. The barrier is erected and maintained by, and for the benefit of, white people. In the discourse of gender, she wrote, that man is not allowed for emotional self-expression, like crying, to make himself a member of the male community, let him be esteemed by other men, and consequently, contribute to his self-esteem. Therefore, it is to their benefit to enforce discipline about crying.
Therefore, someone may argue that, for trans woman, the invalidation of their identity, conversion therapy, and many other forms of transphobia is comparable to the restriction of crying. Given the miserable situation of women and the privileged position of men in our society, actions that prevent a person from becoming a woman (if this person is confused with gender identity and thinking about becoming a woman), take a person back to man (if this person has become a woman since some point of life), or turn a person to a man (if this person is a woman since birth), benefits the person’s wellbeing. Though the miserable situation listed by Watson harms trans women’s short-term benefit, these harms arguably aim to help them in the long term[3].
Might be considered as a reply to this, Watson says, “many trans women’s experiences of socialization to social masculinity was an uncomfortable and unhappy experience.”(Watson, 2016, pp.251) A direct response to this could be that such discomfort is the same as the discomfort when a child is yelled at by the father because of not doing homework. As mentioned above, disciplinary punishment may cause discomfort but is not oppression. However, this understanding might be shallow.
Among examples mentioned before and Frye’s definition, a barrier (and punishment to reinforce the barrier) is not oppressive for a certain group of people only if what the barrier prevents those people from doing is small and will only result in slight pain, and returns much greater benefits. It seems that the right to access a ghetto is not essential or significant for a white person’s well-being, for example. Yet for trans women, womanhood is so important and essential. It is the care that defines who they are. If, for example, because of unexplainable magic, the house of a white person is moved into a ghetto, now accessing the ghetto is not trivial. Though the house is only thousands square feet large, it matters more than the rest of the whole city. Rather than being trapped at home, being prevented from home is more likely to be considered as being subordinated. Considering the greatness of the harm caused by invalidating their identity, it is doubtful that the benefits of being a man could be greater. Moreover, many trans women simply cannot be a man, at least cannot be a man by any transphobia, including conversion therapy. A person will indeed be benefited after becoming a man, but this is not the case for trans women. Therefore, at the individual level, trans women are oppressed by society’s expectations of masculinity.
Trans-exclusive feminists may argue that, at a higher level, for the whole community of people assigned to be male, such barriers are not oppressive. I assume that there is a continuous spectrum of degree of accepting masculinity. On one side is those who innately affiliate with it, on the other side is those who innately cannot affiliate with it and thereby define themselves as trans women, and most people are in the middle – they do not innately affiliate with masculinity but can adapt to masculinity. The barrier helps those middle people to become a member of the privileged group. However, people assigned to be male do not form a community at all; not all people assigned to be male share values and care for each other. Trans women “reject and are rejected” from the practice of masculinity. (Watson, 2016, pp.251) Trans women do have physical similarity with cis men, but such physical similarity is not socially meaningful. Moreover, the idea that forcing trans women become a women is for their benefit entails the ideology of patriarchy. That is to say, the father (and other elder men) have the power to determine what is the good for children and women. Children and women’s privacy and their own preference is not valued.
The analysis in this part shows that the barrier trans woman faces, though is similar to the non-oppressive barrier that cis man faces, are indeed oppression because trans women are forced to be a man, an identity they dislike, cannot have, and, hence, cannot take advantage of. Thus, trans women are under oppression. Though this conclusion may not sound surprising, but as I presented, it is more complex than many people thought.
III. Do trans women endorse oppression?
The analysis above shows that what trans woman faces are indeed oppression. However, this analysis leads to another worry: given that trans women like the current concept of woman, will trans women resist the liberation of woman, an alternation of the concept of woman, and, hence, become enemies of feminists? Replying to this, Watson writes: “Why should trans women, as individuals, bear a special burden in [liberating woman]?” (Watson, 2016, pp.249) She argues that cis feminist women also live in the way that a stereotypical woman lives, so they should not criticize trans women for reinforcing stereotypes of woman. However, again, this defense is not satisfactory.
To begin with, people may doubt her description of cis feminist women. Many cis feminist women do not hesitate to challenge the stereotypes of woman; some even perform a “complete break with the traditional social female image of a woman.” (Gordon et al., 2021) Trans women, however, seem more enthusiastic about having iconic female images, like long hair and skirt. Moreover, it does not affect feminists’ worry about intention. There is no doubt that cis feminist women do not like the current concept of woman and seeks to change it, but trans women seem to endorse it. Won’t they, instead of bearing a special burden in liberating women, have special resistance for the liberation of women because the current chained womanhood is just what they pursue? It is true that (most) trans women want to be a full woman, if not the most stereotypical woman. By full woman, I mean the woman that is a woman in all contexts, including oppressing ones. However, this worry is not true in two ways.
First, it should be noticed that being an abstract “full woman” is usually not what motivates or initiates them to reflect on their assigned sex and identify themselves as a woman or discover their identity as women. For example, almost all transgender women want to use the female bathroom, but most of them do not identify themselves as a woman because they want to use the female bathroom. This is what comes after they identify themselves as a woman. The oppressing part of the current concept of woman is the same. Trans women may want to fit into the oppressive stereotypes of women (e.g., close legs when sitting,) but it is not what motivates or initiates them to reflect on their gender identity and discover their identity as women initially[4]. Given the oppressive nature of these stereotypes, it might be safe to say that most rational people, including trans women, will not have an original and heartfelt desire for them. What makes trans women affiliate with these norms so enthusiastically, then? Recall how parents instill these norms on cis women: my cis female friends told me that, when they open their legs, their parents will say, “you are not sitting like a girl.” Trans women are eager to fit into the oppressive images only if these images are believed as a necessary component of woman, and trans women are in a crisis of validation of identity. When the majority gaze at a trans woman, they will devote a great effort to discern clues about her manhood and prepare to reject her identity. On the other hand, cis women may face less risk when they challenge the stereotypical image. Though they still will be criticized for this, at least cis women are less likely to be rejected from the female bathroom[5], for example. Trans woman obeys oppressive norms probably merely because they face more severe oppression. In a world where the oppressive components of the concept of woman have been eliminated, trans women will also discard the practice of those oppressive norms.
Second, the usage of the term “oppressive norm” by people who worry trans women might endorse oppressive norms shows a lack of reflection and understanding of oppression. It is true that if a trans woman discovers their identity because of some social factor, such as the way to interact with people, then their initial motivation of reflecting on gender identity has a relatively high chance of being oppressive. For example, according to Frye, prohibiting a man from crying is rooted in the oppressive belief that men are rational, but women are emotional and irrational. Therefore, being likely to cry is an oppressive norm for women. Unfortunately, it is undeniable that many people, including some trans women, do heartfeltly like cry. Does it follow that those trans women do like this oppressive belief? Woman’s cry is oppressive, and some trans women like cry, so trans women like the oppressive norm. It seems to be logically sound.
Yet Frye also discovered that the oppression system is like a birdcage. Oppression is a system that consists of countless harmless events[6]. She argues that if we examine each single event microscopely, we cannot understand how the system immobilizes woman; just like if we exam each single wire of the cage, we cannot understand how the cage prevents birds from flying away. It reversely implies that if the oppressive system has been demolished, then every single event might be harmless[7]. (Trans) women who like to cry do not necessarily endorse the oppressive system behind the image of woman cries. And, as I argued before, usual rational people won’t want to be oppressed, so most trans women who like to cry should not want crying to be an oppressive image. The cage analogy also shows that liberating women does not mean preventing women from crying as men; a world where women are liberated should allow women to cry but not see crying as evidence of inferiority. Trans women who like to cry definitely welcome this world.
Also, though trans women may show interest in the oppressive components of the concept of woman, they do not like them heartfeltly; either their interests are a response to the invalidation of their identity, a special kind of oppression only targeted trans people, or their interests are just coincidently oppressive, and they welcome removing the oppressive meaning of their interests.
IV. Is the oppression of trans women based on reproduction?
According to Haslanger’s definition, being oppressed is insufficient for being a woman. Women are oppressed because they are observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction. Colored people and working-class people are also oppressed, but they are not a woman because they are oppressed for different reasons. Are trans women oppressed for the same reason as a woman?
The intuitive answer is no. Non-passing trans women do not have a female reproductive body; thus, they are not oppressed because of this. It might be helpful to consider the case of trans men. If trans women are oppressed for their female reproductive body, then trans men should be privileged for their male reproductive body. However, people roughly agree that trans men are also oppressed, and we could find many similarities between the oppression of trans women and the oppression of trans men. For example, transgender people might not be able to get proper health care because of the inconsistency of assigned sex and gender, while cis women usually do not face this situation. It seems to suggest that trans woman’s oppression is because of a different reason other than having a female reproductive body.
Replying to this, Watson says: “in offering this standard of womanhood, I think many are saying, in effect, ‘Trans women are not women like me.’ But the material reality of women is not uniform”.She argues that intersectional analyses of gender, for example, studies of black feminism, show that many factors, like race, class, or religion, can differentiate the experience of being a woman. the oppressions that cis women face are also different. To say that trans women face different oppression from cis women, has no difference from to say working-class women face different oppression from middle-class women. By saying this, we presuppose someone is a paradigm of woman, and compare those “suspicious” women with the paradigm. However, this argument is still not enough.
On the other hand, to say black men face different oppression from women also has no syntactical difference from to say trans women face different oppression from cis women. Although everyone has unique experiences, There must be something to be the essence of being a woman. We should return to the ameliorative account itself to find the answer of this question. The ameliorative account states that the woman should be defined in the way that best serves the goal of liberating women, though I do not fully understand how Haslanger’s definition helps this goal. To my understanding, women are oppressed by the current gender system; women will be liberated if and only if the current gender system is overthrown. And I think it is safe to say that the new gender system (if there will be one[8]) desired by feminists should be a system that does not oppress anyone.[9] And, I argue that to achieve this goal, acknowledging that trans women are women will be helpful.
To illustrate my opinion, I want to compare homosexual people and transgender people. I see conservative people commenting on lesbian and trans men as a “waste of (reproductive or sexual) resource.” Gays and trans women also receive comments like “failed to further the family line.” We may say that lesbian is commented so because they have a female reproductive body, but considering the case of gay, who are oppressed because of refusing their privileged position (in the heterosexual family), to capture the nature of the oppression of homosexual people accurately, we would better say that they are oppressed because they disobey the current gender system. They refuse to undertake their position and obligation, no matter oppressed or privileged. Remembering the analysis in section 2 about the oppression faced by trans women, we also conclude that trans women are oppressed by the current gender system, which requires biological man be masculine, and women be feminine. The enemy of trans women is as same as the enemy of women – the current oppressive gender system.
Homosexuals, transgender, non-binary, and gender bender are pioneers in resisting the current system, though some do not fully understand the nature of the system or do not resist the whole system and only want to defend their basic rights. Although they are not oppressed in the system (which means oppressed for having a female reproductive body) as women are, they are oppressed by the system. If it is agreed that overthrowing the current system is feminists’ objective, trans people are allies. Politically speaking, creating hostility between alliances will not help the goal of liberating women. What about metaphysically, then? Some people may ask. “We should accept trans women as women because of political consideration” seems a claim that dissatisfies both sides. However, at least for Haslanger, the ameliorative account is mainly a political account that aims to liberate women. She did not give any metaphysical reason for woman to be oppressed because of having a female body also. If claiming trans women are women is the politically best practice to liberate women, she will not hesitate to endorse it. For Bettcher, she also acknowledges that the first-person authority (the doctrine that allows the trans women to be a woman) is a morally best practice instead of metaphysical[10], and I feel that in her defense for the first-person authority, the word morality could be changed to politics without causing big inconsistency. (Bettcher, 2009) Therefore, this conclusion is enough for both sides to endorse – though it is not a requirement for my argument to let any side endorse it.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, though Watson’s arguments are inadequate, after a deep analysis of the nature of oppression and circumstance of trans women, I find trans women are indeed oppressed. Though they are not oppressed in the same way as women because they do not have a female reproductive body, they are oppressed by the same system of gender but in a different way. Because cis women and trans women are oppressed by the same system, to achieve women’s liberation, Haslanger should consider them women to create alliances.
[1] In the following part of this essay, I will use “having female reproductive body” as abbreviation of “observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction”. I acknowledge such abbreviation discards some information from the original one, but given the length of the original phrase and the frequency of this phrase appears in this essay, I feel it is justified to do so.
[2] Some philosophers also argue that, because pass trans woman has the history of being treated and privileged as man, they are not fully women. This concern has been addressed by Watson and will not be discussed in this essay.
[3] It is arguable that the example of murder cannot be interpreted as “harming in the short term to benefit long term.” However, it could be said that murdering one person who wants to be a trans woman will effectively warn other trans women, push them to become a man, and benefit them. This harms an individual but benefits the whole trans woman community.
[4] In fact, many trans women discover their identity because they feel they have mismatch with their body. Haslanger claims that, in the new, non-oppressive concept of gender, the part regards reproductive feature of body should be kept. So, what they desire are just what Haslanger wants to include in the concept of woman, though current medical technology could not give them a body capable of female reproductive role. However, because the relation between body and gender is too complex, these trans women won’t be furtherly discussed in the following part of my essay. In the following part, I will assume that trans women discover their identity because of some social elements, like the way to interact with people, which seems to be most vulnerable to criticism of being the oppressive part of the concept of woman.
[5] Though some cis women, such as Watson, are frequently rejected from the female bathroom because of their male appearance.
[6] By events I (and Frye) mean a very broad concept. It presents in many different ways, like a man’s kind intention of protecting woman, spoken or unspoken rules, design of handle of hammer that optimizes for man’s hand, and in this case, a trans woman’s desire to cry and be identified as woman.
[7] Though Some events, like rejecting women from health care, directly harms the oppressed group, regardless the existence of the systematic oppression; but I believe the events we discuss here is harmful only when they collaborate with the system.
[8] Haslanger claims that in the ideal world there should be a non-oppressive gender system, though some other feminists, including me, believe that there should not be gender in any form in the ideal world.
[9] I see some radical women want to establish a gender system that oppresses men. Yet I feel it is appropriate to exclude them from the conversation.
[10] First person authority means that the person herself/himself is the authority to determine her/his gender. “Woman is whom identify herself as woman” is true if and only if first person authority is true. Bettcher acknowledges that in many cases people may not be the person knows themselves best, so first person authority is not metaphysically true.
Reference:
Bettcher, T. M. (2009). Trans Identities and First-Person Authority . In L. Shrage (Ed.), “You’ve Changed”: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity (pp. 98–120). Oxford University Press.
Bettcher, T. M. (2013). Trans Women and the Meaning of “Woman”. In A. Soble, N. Power, & R. Halwani (Eds.), Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, sixth edition (pp. 233–250). essay, Rowan & Littlefield.
Bettcher, T. M. (2014). Trapped in the wrong theory: Rethinking trans oppression and resistance. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 39(2), 383–406. https://doi.org/10.1086/673088
Bettcher, T. M. (2017). Trans feminism: Recent philosophical developments. Philosophy Compass, 12(11). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12438
Frye, M. (1983). Oppression. In The politics of reality: Essays in feminist theory (pp. 1–16). Crossing Press.
Gordon, N. S., & Huang, Y. (2021). The Oppositional Gaze as Spectacle: Feminist visual protest movements in China. In N. M. Goins, B. K. Alexander, & F. J. McAlister (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Gender and Communication (pp. 585–599). Routledge.
Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and race: (what) are they? (what) do we want them to be? Noûs, 34(1), 31–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00201
Jenkins, K. (2016). Amelioration and inclusion: Gender identity and the concept of woman. Ethics, 126(2), 394–421. https://doi.org/10.1086/683535
Watson, L. (2016). The woman question. TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, 3(1-2), 246–253. https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-3334451